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foundationalism. While Reformed theologians have rejected natural theology, 
Calvin would, I think, be rather surprised by Plantinga's analysis. Calvin does 
not reject natural theology as such, for he does not discuss proofs for God's 
existence; rather, he rejects the whole theological method of the Schoolmen. He 
rejects their employment of philosophical reasoning in theology and he focusses 
instead on commenting on Scripture, using the tools developed by the Humanists. 
Also, Calvin expresses admiration for the sciences of the day, and makes no 
criticisms about how they are ordered. His point is that they are valuable only 
in relation to earthly things and not for learning about God or salvation. That 
must come from Scripture. The latter part of Plantinga's essay is devoted to 
explaining why the fact that belief in God can be basic does not mean that 
anything goes-such as a belief in the great pumpkin. Belief in God is not 
groundless and Plantinga indicates in a preliminary way some of its justifying 
circumstances. Finally, he argues that holding belief in God to be basic does 
not mean that argument is irrelevant to this belief. 
In the final essay, Roy Clouser offers an alternative view of religious language. 
Language about God is, he says, "ordinary language" rather than analogical 
language. Against analogy he argues that it requires some likeness between the 
two realities compared and there is nothing univocally true of God and creatures. 
Instead Clouser proposes that all properties and relations which Biblical writers 
attribute to God are created properties, properties which he has taken on in 
relation to the universe. In this framework the trinity, for example, becomes a 
created property which God assumes to himself. Clouser's proposal is inventive, 
but it raises at least as many questions as it answers. 
Although the authors of these essays write from diverse philosophical perspec-
tives, they express a unifying theme: reason must be subordinated to the claims 
of faith. Throughout the authors indicate the limits of reason and the role of 
commitment. This volume manifests the continuing vitality of the Calvinist 
tradition and the contribution it is making on the contemporary philosophical 
scene. 
The Quest for Eternity: An Outline of the Philosophy of Religion, by J.C.A. 
Gaskin. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1984. 197pp. Paper $4.95. 
Reviewed by THOMAS V. MORRIS, University of Notre Dame. 
This is a clearly written introduction to rational reflection on the credibility 
of theism. It is well organized, relatively free of technical philosophical jargon, 
and devoid of the sort of overly complex arguments beginners to philosophy 
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often find daunting. In addition, it effectively portrays theism and atheism as 
providing in the end very different world views with practical implications for 
how we see ourselves. The publisher advertises the book as an "objective" 
treatment of its subject matter. And it is evident, upon reading it, that the author 
sometimes goes out of his way to try to be fair: Although he says that he finds 
theism "intrinsically incredible," and considers the argumentative support which 
can be marshalled in its behalf to be decidedly weak, he attempts to point also 
to some weaknesses in any atheistic view of the world, and finally concedes that 
it may be rational for some people to be theists. As a matter of fact, though, 
the tone of the book is by no means "objective." Often writing in the first person, 
Gaskin cannot seem to avoid letting his own perspective at times seriously distort 
how he handles a theistic claim or argument. His tone is in places quite depre-
ciating, and on occasion he comes far too close to dismissing an important idea 
or set of arguments in serious philosophical theology with little more than a 
colorful epithet. For example, after introducing the problem of reconciling God's 
omniscience with human free will, he chooses, rather than to consider carefully 
serious theistic attempts to deal with the problem, merely to generalize about 
these efforts as involving intellectual "contortions" and "labyrinthine 
extremities," and as leading into"a hideous thicket" of "absurdities." His own 
biases seem often to function to allow him to cut a discussion short, and to stand 
satisfied with a point made against theism or some theistic argument which is 
left at a far from satisfactory stage of development. In the light of all this, it is 
a bit surprising to find him conclude the book with the rather wistful remark 
that (p. 179): 
As I write this last sentence, my mind inclines to the not altogether 
disagreeable Epicurean acceptance that the world is as it is, and is all 
there is; but the hope of other worlds somehow lingers. 
In the first chapter, Gaskin argues against a number of contemporary avante 
garde theologians that the religions of JUdaism, Christianity, and Islam depend 
fundamentally on a metaphysic of theism, the central claim of which is that, in 
Gaskin's words, "there exists one God who is creator and sustainer of all things; 
who is omnipotent, omniscient and eternal; who is an agent able to act everywhere 
without a body, and who is morally concerned with mankind" (24). It is then 
the task he sets himself to investigate the rational credentials of this claim. 
In chapter two, Gaskin attempts to justify the search for evidence and arguments 
he plans to pursue by criticizing fideism, which he understands to be the perspec-
tive on religious belief that denies the appropriateness or relevance of evidence 
and rational argument in matters of religion. He offers at least two arguments 
against adopting this perspective, one which he clearly intends to be attractive 
to the unbeliever as well as to the religious believer, the other directed primarily 
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to the believer. Both arguments begin from a common distinction between causes 
which may have brought about a person's holding of a belief, and any reason 
for which the belief might be held to be true. The first argument then seems to 
go like this: A belief is a conviction about a possible state of affairs in the public 
(presumably, external) world only if it is anchored in a reality beyond the 
believer's mind by evidence. The major Western religions have presented their 
central theistic belief as such a conviction. Thus, in order to evaluate them 
properly, we must ask whether the appropriate sort of evidence exists that theism 
is true. Naturalistic accounts are available in principle for the rise and persistence 
of religious beliefs, but they do not alone either preclude or prejudge a search 
for evidence, or reasons. If we are to judge these religions in accordance with 
what they claim to be, we are thus both allowed and required to look for evidence 
and arguments concerning theism. Gaskin then argues that the availability of a 
naturalistic account of the causes of religious beliefs affects the epistemic 
dynamics of such beliefs: In order to qualify for rationality, they must be "evidence 
sensitive." Otherwise, reason demands that we dismiss the beliefs, understanding 
them only in terms of their causes. 
Although he labels the target of his attack here 'fideism,' it is clear that Gaskin 
would reject the view of religious belief as properly basic developed in recent 
years by Alvin Plantinga and others, regardless of whether it is accurately 
categorized together with the irrationalistic disregard of argument of any kind 
more commonly known as fideism. And in a later chapter on religious experience, 
Gaskin fails to consider at all the claim that religious belief can be related to 
religious experience in something like the way in which some beliefs about 
physical objects are related to the physical object experiences which occasion 
them-the beliefs being grounded in the experience without being based on 
anything like evidence or reasons of the sort Gaskin has in mind. In consequence, 
his apparent insistence on the necessity of positive evidence or cogent pieces of 
natural theology in support of the existence of God as a requisite for the rationality 
of theistic belief will be seen by many philosophers as begging some important 
questions. 
Consider the following beliefs we all hold concerning our means for attaining 
knowledge about the world: 
(1) Sense experience is sometimes reliable. 
(2) Memory is sometimes reliable. 
(3) Testimony is sometimes reliable. 
(4) Inductive reasoning is sometimes reliable. 
It cannot be the case that any of these beliefs is reasonable if good (non-circular, 
etc.) evidence is required for all of them. At least some such beliefs must be 
held as basic, without the need of being based on evidence. This is widely 
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accepted nowadays, although Gaskin nowhere recognizes such a limitation on 
the need for evidence or positive argumentative support. But suppose he did. It 
might be that, like Anthony Kenny, he holds religious belief to be sufficiently 
different from these paradigms of basicality to always require evidence. He might 
think, for example, that although non-circular evidence is not possible for (2) 
(evidence whose gathering and consideration does not presuppose the truth of 
(2», and so not properly required for (2), non-circular evidence is possible in 
principle for theism, and that this disqualifies religious belief from being properly 
basic. If he has some such reason for disregarding anything like the basicality 
option, he should have said so. The view that religious belief is properly basic 
is too important an option to be just ignored, even in an introductory book. 
Chapter three presents us with the ontological, cosmological, and design argu-
ments for the existence of God. After a fairly standard and uninspiring look at 
Anselm's discovery, Gaskin moves on to give an interesting characterization of 
those fundamental cosmic questions which give rise to a posteriori arguments 
for theism. This section of the chapter is marred only by a somewhat surprising 
attack on the idea of creation ex nihilo, during which the notion is termed 
"intuitively odd," "recondite in the extreme," and even "repugnant." He argues 
that we cannot possibly observe creation from nothing, apparently since the truth 
conditions of the required unrestricted negative existential could never come 
within our perceptual purview, and so that we have as strong an argument as 
experience can provide that there cannot be creation from nothing. But of course, 
it is not the case that for just any proposition p about the physical world, the 
lack of, or even the impossibility of, any complete observation of the truth 
conditions of p requires or even permits the rational denial of p. I It is surprising 
that Gaskin apparently thinks otherwise. 
The discussion of the cosmological argument is fairly interesting, but contains 
what seem to me to be a number of flaws and oversights. Consider for instance 
a problem widely thought to attend the theist's application of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason (PSR) to derive the existence of God: Very roughly, the theist 
begins apparently by contending that for everything, for every positive fact, 
there must be an explanation. With suitable argument, he produces God as a 
being whose activity of creation provides the requisite explanation for the exist-
ence of the world. But then what about God? It looks like PSR will require an 
explanation of his existence and of his activity'S being what it is, and that this 
explanation will have to be in terms of something else which in tum will need 
explaining, and so on, ad infinitum, so that a full, complete explanation for the 
contents of reality will never be available, contrary to what PSR demands. So 
the classical theist, notoriously disinclined to tolerate infinite regresses, brings 
one on himself by his endorsement and use of PSR. 
Gaskin suggests that unless PSR is understood as holding only within the 
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context of the physical universe, such an embarrassing regress is unavoidable. 
But if this restriction is made, he claims, the principle is saved from such a 
regress only to render it powerless to generate an argument to the existence of 
a being outside of, or distinct from, the physical universe. However, the sugges-
tion that PSR be understood as holding only within the context of the physical 
universe can be taken in either of two ways. On one reading, this restriction 
delimits the explananda (candidates for explanation, or things needing explana-
tion) falling within the scope of PSR to only items within the physical universe. 
On a second reading, both explananda and explanantia (facts or objects providing 
explanations) are limited to the contents of the physical universe. It is only this 
second reading which will let Gaskin's argument go through, but it is only 
something like the first reading of this suggestion which will have to be acknow-
ledged by theists if any kind of untoward regress is to be blocked, and of course 
it is only this sort of construal which will be acceptable to theists in the first place. 
More precisely, however, what is required for a non-problematic cosmological 
argument is not an entirely ad hoc restriction of PSR which simply specifies that 
it applies only to explananda within the physical, or natural universe, but rather 
a two-fold general restriction which arguable will entail that only such explananda 
fall within its scope. First, it can be argued in two distinct ways that PSR must 
be restricted so as not to apply to free actions. For one thing, Buriden's Ass 
problems seem to show that such events, and their correlate facts, do not satisfy 
PSR. Free choices can be made by agents who have no sufficient reason for 
choosing precisely as they do. So, if PSR is to have any reasonable chance of 
being true, it must be qualified in the light of this. But in order to justify fully 
the conclusion that PSR must be restricted so as not to apply to free acts at all, 
a further and distinct line of argument is needed. The first sort of argument I 
have just alluded to, the sort of argument which arises from considerations 
brought to light by Buriden's Ass problems, turns on an interpretation of 'suffi-
cient reason' linked to the sense of 'reason' in accordance with which a reason 
is something an agent has, something entertained and acted on by an agent. But 
a traditional construal of PSR allows any object, event, or state of affairs 0 to 
provide a sufficient reason for the existence, occurrence, or obtaining of an 
explanandum E just in case (I) 0 is ontologically distinct from E, (2) 0 is not 
causally dependent on E, and (3) 0 entails E, regardless of whether 0 contains 
or involves the sort of sufficient reason an agent might have for doing as he 
does. It might be thought that in this broad and general sense of 'sufficient 
reason' there could be a sufficient reason for every possible free act even if in 
many cases the agent involved does not himself have a sufficient reason (in the 
psychological sense) for doing precisely as he does. 
But if we do understand PSR in this way as requiring, in the general sense 
of 'sufficient reason,' explanations involving explanantia ontologically distinct 
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from, and not causally dependent upon, whatever explanandum is in question 
then allowing free acts within its scope would itself generate unacceptable infinite 
regresses within the context of the physical, or natural, universe. For on PSR, 
the occurrence of a free act would have to be explained in terms of something 
distinct from the act which was sufficient for its occurrence. But assuming a 
libertarian conception of free action, which nowadays most theists assume and 
which seems to have a great deal of congruence with the overall theistic vision, 
the explanantia for any free act could not involve only conditions independent, 
and outside the control, of the agent of the act, such as natural conditions prior 
to the act's occurrence. Those explanantia would have to involve something for 
which the agent was freely responsible, say, an intention to so act. But then the 
obtaining of that intention would also require an explanation, whose terms would, 
it seems, have to include some distinct entity, event, or mental item again within 
the control of the agent, and so on, and so on. Unlike the soft determinist, the 
theistic libertarian would seem, by the application of PSR to contexts involving 
free actions, to be committing himself to an infinitely regressive explanation for 
every free act involving the absurd postulation of infinitely many volitional 
features of the agent, within his control and mediating between him and the act, 
such as intentions to act, desires to intend to act, intentions to desire to intend 
to act, and so on, ad infinitum et absurdum. 
So if the theist wants a plausible version of PSR, the demand for sufficient 
reasons cannot apply unrestrictedly throughout contexts of free action. But the 
introduction of such a qualification involves only one component of the two-fold 
general restriction of PSR needed for a cosmological argument free of unsatisfac-
tory infinite regresses. Recall that the theist being discussed by Gaskin wants to 
employ a plausible general demand for explanations which can find a natural 
and proper stopping-point in, and only in, the recognition of the existence and 
free creative actions of a being such as God. The existence and actions of that 
being cannot be such as to cry out for explanation just as obviously as any feature 
of the natural world which can give rise to this sort of argument. Otherwise, the 
theist cannot plausibly claim the existence and activity of a God to provide an 
appropriate culmination and end of the explanatory quest. 
If the restriction of PSR concerning free actions is to stand, the postulated 
free, creative activity of God is not such as to require, by the terms of PSR, 
further explanation. But what of the postulated existence of God? How can the 
theist call a halt to the demand for explanation here? Will there not have to be 
an explanation for it, and in tum for the existence or occurrence of whatever 
explains it, and so on, ad infinitum? Typically, the point of such questions is to 
get the theist to recognize that we must call a halt to the demand for explanations 
somewhere, and that if there is no good reason to think that the postulation of 
a God's existence is distinctively appropriate as such a stopping-point, there is 
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no point in extrapolating beyond the bounds of the natural world we all know 
to exist in the first place. 
Some theists have tried to exempt the existence of God from the demand for 
explanation, and so call a proper halt to any potential, infinitely regressive quest 
here, by specifying that PSR should be restricted so as to apply only to contingent 
facts, and never to necessary entities or states of affairs. The claim then is that 
since God is a necessary being, existent in all possible worlds, the demands of 
PSR do not apply to him. And of course just as well known as this response is 
its characterization as begging the question against the non-theist. After all, it 
is said, if we could accept the description of God as a necessary being, we 
wouldn't need a cosmological argument to tell us whether such a being exists. 
The insight behind this attempted restriction is that, typically, why something 
is the case requires explanation only if it could have been otherwise. On this 
common way of thinking, the existence of a necessarily existent being, a being 
which exists in all possible worlds, will not cry out for explanation, at least not 
for the sort of explanation demanded by PSR. The world could not have been 
otherwise. But in order to exploit this common assumption about explanation, 
the theist need not characterize God as a necessarily existent being. Working 
from the same assumption, or intuition, about explanation, the theist can carefully 
suggest that PSR not apply to the existence of any entity which is such that, if 
it exists in any possible world, exists in all. God can be said to satisfy this 
condition without any blatant question begging against the non-theist, and without 
rendering superfluous lines of reasoning such as the cosmological argument. 
So, for roughly these reasons, reasons which cannot be spelled out any further 
here, if PSR is restricted so as not to require sufficient, independent reasons for 
(a) free acts, or for (b) the existence of any entity which is by nature such that 
if it exists in any possible world, it exists in all, then the theist will have a 
principle whose scope arguably extends over only explananda within the natural, 
or physical universe (consonant with one reading of Gaskin's suggestion), but 
which can generate an argument to the existence of a Creator God distinct from 
the physical universe without pain of regress, contrary to what Gaskin thinks 
possible. If Gaskin had looked into the matter further, he might have seen that 
the theist need not judge himself to be in such a position that he has a defensible 
principle in PSR only if it is a principle which will not lead to theism. 
After examining one form of the argument from design, and there acknow-
ledging that certain very general questions about the universe may after all 
provide some weak support for theism, Gaskin turns his attention in chapter four 
to a consideration of religious experience. He asks whether religious experience 
can serve as good evidence for the existence of God, and maintains that it can 
only if it is clearly identifiable as a certain type of experience. Any experience 
can be categorized, according to Gaskin, as experience of an externally existing 
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object, such as a stone or tree, or as experience of an internally existing object 
such as a dream or pain. He says: 
By experience of an externally existing object I mean experience such 
that any other person rightly and possibly situated, with normally func-
tioning senses, powers of attention, and a suitable conceptual understand-
ing, will have the same or a closely similar experience. (80) 
A religious experience will have evidential value only if it is clearly identifiable 
as ofthis type. And since Gaskin apparently understands the experiential situation 
of a person only in naturalistic terms, it comes as no surprise that, on the basis 
of the account just given, he judges it unclear that any religious experience is 
ever of the appropriate type to serve as part of a case for theism. 
In chapter five Gaskin begins to consider problems for theism. After rehearsing 
very briefly the positivist rejection of religious utterances as cognitively meaning-
less, he registers his own worries about the sense of religious claims. First, he 
suggests that non-bodily agency such as theists recognize in the case of God is 
"on the face of it ... incoherent," and then he expresses difficulty in under-
standing how a person could exist without a single point of view from some one 
point in space. He finally considers that the only way of understanding God's 
claimed ability to act directly on any part of the universe will involve seeing the 
world as standing to God in somewhat the way in which (ideally) our bodies 
stand to us. He quickly, and mistakenly, characterizes this as the view tnat God 
just is the universe, and then claims that on such a view theism ends up no 
different from atheism. But of course theists who draw a mind-body analogy 
between God and the world are dualists of some sort and espouse a view which 
in no way entails the effacement of the ultimate distinction between theism and 
atheism. Taking a final parting shot at the traditional claim that God is of a 
different order of reality from the physical universe, Gaskin indicates that he 
finds such claims senseless, and wraps up his discussion by saying: 
Sensational metaphysics without an iota of empirical evidence in support 
are snares for the gullible, not paths to reasoned truth. (116) 
In chapter six, Gaskin offers a fairly standard presentation of the problem of 
evil, concluding finally that natural evil constitutes strong evidence against 
theism. In this chapter, he also presents the problem of foreknowledge and free 
will and the traditional belief in miracles as embarrassments to theism. He 
concludes that the rational considerations available to us as we reflect on theism 
point to its falsehood. 
However, as he indicates in the concluding two chapters, one sketching out 
what he considers unsatisfying moral features of atheism, the other summing up 
the results of the book, the evidential situation he takes us to be in need not be 
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thought to eliminate the rationality of anyone's being a theist. The positive 
evidential considerations there are for theism (as slight as he thinks them to be), 
coupled with the lack of tight demonstrative proof that theism is incoherent or 
false, augmented by some pragmatic considerations regarding morality may, 
according to Gaskin, allow theism rationally to be held. 
In the preface to his introductory book in the philosophy of psychology, 
Psychological Explanation, Jerry Fodor a few years ago remarked: 2 
I think many philosophers secretly harbor the view that there is something 
deeply (i.e., conceptually) wrong with psychology, but that a philoso-
pher with a little training in the techniques of linguistic analysis and a 
free afternoon could straighten it out. 
Substituting 'religion' for 'psychology' in this quote, I think we would have 
an illuminating explanation for one of the most common sorts of failing in much 
recent writing in the philosophy of religion: Too many philosophers have found 
themselves with a free afternoon. The failing I have in mind is the failure to 
take seriously the many profound, and profoundly difficult issues at stake in the 
responsible consideration of the major claims of the theistic tradition. The result 
is an unsatisfying degree of superficiality and a rash drawing of negative conclu-
sions which, while it does represent one brand of philosophizing (one our students 
are all too prone to), does not represent the sort of philosophical care we want 
to find in even an introductory text. Though Gaskin's book is interesting and 
for the most part enjoyable to read, it seems to me to suffer from this failing 
throughout. 
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